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Abstract: Consider agents who are heterogeneous in their preferences and wealth
levels. These agents may acquire information prior to choosing an investment that
has a property of no-arbitrage, and each piece of information bears a corresponding
cost. We associate a numeric index to each information purchase (information-cost
pair). This index describes the normalized value of the information purchase: it is the
risk-aversion level of the unique CARA agent who is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the purchase, and it is characterized by a “duality” principle that states
that agents with a stronger preference for information should engage more often in
information purchases. No agent more risk-averse than the index finds it profitable
to acquire the information, whereas all agents less risk-averse than the index do.
Given an empirically measured range of degrees of risk aversion in a competitive
economy with no-arbitrage investments, our model therefore comes close to describ-
ing an inverse demand for information, by predicting what pieces of information are
acquired by agents and which ones are not. Among several desirable properties, the
normalized-value formula induces a complete ranking of information structures that
extends Blackwell’s classic ordering.
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1 Introduction
We refer to any pair consisting of an information structure and a price for it as
an information purchase. Such purchases, if they happen, are the manifestation
of the demand for information. How many people purchase a piece of information
necessarily depends on three components: the quality of that information, the cost
of acquiring it, and the agents’ primitives given by their wealth and preferences. The
current paper aims at answering the following questions. First, given an information
purchase, can its normalized value, which captures the information-price tradeoff,
be uniquely characterized?1 Second, in a competitive economy, who are the agents
willing to go ahead with a given information purchase?
We answer these questions by analyzing information purchases made by risk-
averse agents (or investors) prior to choosing among risky investments. Key to our
analysis is the set of investments available which we call no-arbitrage investments. In
order to study information acquisition based on investment motives, we assume that
no-arbitrage investments are not profitable under the agents’ prior; the only investors
who find investments profitable are the ones who acquire some information. Second,
we note that for the value of information to be meaningful and comparable across
heterogeneous agents, one needs the set of available investments to be rich enough; in
particular, we assume the existence of complete markets.2 We follow the literature on
this subject (such as Kelly, 1956; Arrow, 1971) and take as no-arbitrage investments
the set of all those with a nonpositive expected return under the prior.3
We begin by showing that an agent’s demand, or her preference, for information
1We add the “normalized” qualification because the index will also rely on the price of the pur-
chase, and not be based only on the information structure. The term “normalized informativeness”
could also be used to refer to our index.
2For instance, some agents find it beneficial to have access to a certain futures market, while
others do not value information about this market as much.
3No-arbitrage investments, in this sense of not offering any profitable or “arbitrage” opportunity,
were also used in Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2013). “No-speculative” investments could be
an alternative name to express the same idea.
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is characterized by her degree of risk aversion. Less risk-averse agents have a stronger
preference for information than do more risk-averse agents, in the following sense.
We show that an agent u1 is uniformly less risk-averse than agent u2 if and only if
the fact that agent u2 acquires some information is enough to guarantee that agent
u1 also acquires that information, independently of the wealth levels considered.
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Therefore, agents’ demand for information in our model is entirely captured by their
uniform ranking of risk aversion.
We seek an objective underpinning of normalized values. That is, paralleling the
approach of Aumann and Serrano (2008) for ordering riskiness, we apply the following
duality principle to define the normalized value of an information purchase:5 For an
information purchase to be considered as objectively more valuable than another
one, it must be the case that, whenever an agent is willing to accept the latter, every
agent with a stronger preference for information must, a fortiori, accept the former.
To be more precise, when we say that “u1 likes information better than u2,” we
mean “If u2 accepts a purchase at some wealth level, then u1 accepts it at any wealth
level” (uniform comparison). For this ordering, we introduce a suitable corresponding
ordering of information purchases according to the duality principle described above:
“If u1 likes information better than u2, and if a1 is more valuable than a2, then u1
should accept a1 if u2 accepts a2.” We show that this yields a complete ordering
of information purchases, which is characterized by our normalized-value formula.
The normalized value of the purchase turns out to be equal to the risk aversion of
the unique CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) agent who is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting it. Such a critical level of risk aversion is expressed as a
specific function of relative entropies and the price of the purchase, where the function
4To be precise, u1 is uniformly less risk-averse than u2 when, for all wealth levels w1 and w2, the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion of u1 at w1 is not greater than the coefficient of risk aversion of
u2 at w2.
5In Aumann and Serrano (2008), riskiness is conceived as “dual” to risk aversion, while here the
value of information is “dual” to preference for information.
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is increasing with respect to the former and decreasing with respect to the latter.6
The fact that a purchase has a higher normalized value than another one does
not mean that more agents will accept it. Rather, a purchase having a higher nor-
malized value is equivalent to that purchase having a larger set of agents who accept
it regardless of their initial wealth. Thus, for CARA agents, the more valuable a
purchase is, the more of them accept it. But more importantly, given our results
connecting preferences for information and risk aversion in our settings, any agent
(CARA or not) whose risk aversion always exceeds the normalized value will re-
ject the purchase, while any agent whose risk aversion is less than the normalized
value for all wealth levels, will accept it. The remaining agents, whose risk aversion
for some initial wealth level is below the normalized value but above it for other
wealth levels, may accept or reject the purchase; in other words, their decision is
”subject to wealth effects.” Were it not for this latter set of agents, the entire set
of agents who accept an information purchase would be monotonically increasing in
the normalized value of the purchase. Having said that, if we assume that agents are
sufficiently heterogeneous in their wealth, and that we can know the degree of risk
aversion of agents, then the normalized value of information purchases is a useful
tool that delivers a clear prediction of what pieces of information will be acquired in
a competitive economy (i.e., in which each investor views herself as so small that her
information purchase decision does not signal any relevant information to the rest of
the economy).7
6In the appendix, we provide two alternative definitions of preference for information: (i) “If
u2 accepts a purchase at some wealth level, then u1 accepts it at some wealth level” (minimal
comparison); and (ii) “If u2 accepts at some wealth level w, then u1 also accepts at w, for every
w” (wealth-wise comparison). We formulate the corresponding orderings based on the duality
principle. Strikingly, all three orderings of information purchases coincide: all three are represented
by our normalized-value formula. As we also show in the appendix, another characterization of the
normalized value is expressed in terms of the group of agents who are willing to accept a given
information purchase. This parallels the work of Hart (2011), who provides this comparison of
orderings for indices of riskiness.
7Even nonatomic agents are often able to avoid detection of informed trading in financial markets
by, for example, hiding the order size. See, e.g. Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman
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Our normalized-value measure provides some interesting insights on the demand
for information. For instance, a decrease by a certain percentage in the cost of in-
formation translates into an increase in the same proportion in the normalized value
of the corresponding information purchase. This means that, whenever the price of
information drops by half, agents who are twice more risk-averse than those who
initially bought a piece of information, become now willing to acquire that piece of
information. Another insight is obtained by examining the least and most valuable
purchases. Quite intuitively, the least valuable purchases are the ones associated
to those with null informational content. Perhaps surprisingly, the most valuable
purchases include not only those that always allow the purchaser to learn the true
fundamental state, but also all those that always allow the purchaser to exclude one
fundamental state from the set of all possible states that will be realized. More gen-
erally, our ordering of information purchases is monotonic with respect to Blackwell
(1951)’s ordering of information structures.
As with any index, it is important to understand what our formula is telling
us. Ours is the first index to directly capture the information-price tradeoff in an
information purchase. It does so by separating that tradeoff from potential wealth
effects. We assume a competitive economy in which only no-arbitrage investments are
available before the arrival of new information. In such an economy, the higher the
index of an information purchase, the larger set of risk-averse investors who would
accept the purchase regardless of their wealth. Also, a smaller set of risk-averse
investors would reject it regardless of their wealth. Since it is a numeric index, our
normalized-value formula orders all information purchases. And hence, for a fixed
price, it orders all information structures.
It is important to compare our results here with those of Cabrales, Gossner, and
Serrano (2013), where we have provided another information index. In that paper,
the informativeness of an information structure is characterized by the reduction of
(2009).
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entropy from the prior to the posteriors. That entropy informativeness index is silent
regarding the information-price tradeoff in an information purchase. Nevertheless,
with a uniform prior, and for small amounts of information, that index is close to
the index proposed here when the purchase price is kept constant. But they differ
significantly when the amount of information in the signals is larger.
The methodology we use here is very different, and it complements the one we
used in Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2013). In that paper, one piece of infor-
mation is more valuable than another one if the maximal price any agent in the
economy is willing to pay for the former is larger than the maximal willingness to
pay for the latter. The comparison is made while all agents have the same wealth
level. Also, the class of utility functions considered there excluded the possibility of
ruin. Therefore, that index is more relevant when agents are homogeneous in wealth
and wish to end up with nonnegative wealth with probability 1. In contrast, in this
paper, we allow wealth levels to differ across agents, who consider the contingency of
negative wealth. This is either because of a high price in the information purchase
or because of losses in the investment chosen. Importantly, our index is a vehicle
to reveal wealth-independent demand for information, defined as the set of agents
who accept the purchase regardless of their wealth, rather than on the maximal
price an agent in the economy is willing to pay for it. Thus, we view both indices
as providing different useful ways to evaluate a given information structure. As an
additional insight, we have shown that while our “maximum price dominance” led
to a well-known object –entropy reduction– in our previous paper, thereby endowing
entropy with new meaning, our more axiomatic approach in the current study, based
on duality, leads to a formula that is new to information theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 relates
the value of information and risk aversion. Section 4 introduces the “uniformly more
valuable” ordering, the normalized-value formula, and establishes our main result.
Section 5 presents our results connecting the normalized value of an information
6
purchase to levels of risk aversion in the economy. Section 6 examines a number
of properties of the normalized value and presents several examples. Section 7 is
devoted to related literature, and Section 8 concludes. Some of the more technical
proofs and additional justifications and properties of the index are collected in an
appendix.
2 The Model
We consider an agent who, prior to making an investment decision, may acquire
some information at a cost. In this section we define the conditions under which this
agent acquires a piece of information.
2.1 Utility for Wealth
We consider an investor with initial wealth w and a monetary utility function u
defined on R. We assume that u is nondecreasing, strictly concave,8 and twice
differentiable. We let U be the set of such monetary utility functions. We identify
agents by their monetary utility functions; thus, the term “agent u” refers to an
agent with utility function u.
Given u ∈ U and w ∈ R, let ρu(w) = −u′′(w)u′(w) be the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of
absolute risk aversion of agent u at wealth w. We also let R(u) = supw ρu(w), and
R(u) = infw ρu(w). We say that agent u2 is uniformly less risk-averse than agent u1
whenever R(u2) ≤ R(u1). It is sometimes necessary to assume that u has decreasing
absolute risk aversion in wealth. We thus let UDA be the subset of agents in U for
whom ρu is nonincreasing.
8In our framework, risk-neutral agents would sometimes make unbounded optimal investments,
which creates technical problems while adding little to content. We therefore exclude them from
the analysis.
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2.2 Investments
There is a finite set K of states of nature, about which the agent is uncertain.
The agent’s prior on K is p ∈ ∆(K), assumed to have full support. The set of
investment opportunities consists of all no-arbitrage assets given p, that is, assets
with a nonpositive expected return: B∗ = {x ∈ RK ,∑k pkxk ≤ 0}.9 When (i) the
agent’s initial wealth is w, (ii) x ∈ B∗ is chosen, and (iii) state k is realized, the
agent’s final wealth is w + xk.
Some features of the set B∗ of available investments are worth emphasizing. First,
0 ∈ B∗, that is, not investing is feasible. Second, no agent in our class prefers to
invest in the absence of new information, although this may change if some new
information arrives. With “no-arbitrage” assets, the only motive for investing is
the arrival of new information, and for this reason “no-arbitrage” assets provide a
useful framework to measure the value of information. Finally, B∗ is unbounded, an
assumption which, although common in the literature on investment under limited
information (see, e.g., Kelly, 1956; Arrow, 1971), may appear incompatible with real-
life markets. Note, however, that all agents whose posteriors are in the interior of
∆(K) choose investments that are bounded. This implies in particular that replacing
B∗ by a sufficiently large compact subset spanning all dimensions of uncertainty
(complete markets) would not change the analysis when posteriors are interior. See
also Section 6.6 for more on this point.
2.3 Information Purchases
Before choosing an investment, the agent has the opportunity to engage in an in-
formation purchase a = (µ, α). Here, µ > 0 represents the cost of the information
9The vector p = (p1, . . . , pk, . . . , pK) in the definition of no-arbitrage assets corresponds to the
price vector of Arrow securities, where pk can be interpreted as the price of an asset that pays 1 in
state k and 0 in all other states. The fact that this vector coincides with the agent’s prior p means
that no-arbitrage assets cannot yield a positive expected return. We disentangle the two roles of p
–price and priors– in subsection E.3 in the appendix.
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purchase, paid up front, and α is the information structure representing the infor-
mation obtained from a. That is, α is given by a finite set of signals Sα, together
with probabilities αk ∈ ∆(Sα) for every k.10 When the state of nature is k, αk(s) is
the probability that the signal observed by the agent is s. Signal s has an ex-ante
probability pα(s) =
∑
k pkαk(s) of being realized, and we assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that pα(s) > 0 for every s. For each signal s ∈ Sα, we let qsα = (qsk)k ∈ ∆(K)
be the posterior probability distribution conditional on s, and derived from Bayes’
rule.
We say that a is excluding, if for every signal s, there exists k such that qsk = 0. It
is nonexcluding otherwise. Excluding information purchases are such that, for every
received signal, there exists a state of nature that the agent can exclude.
2.4 Optimal Investment after Receiving Information
Given a belief q, an agent with wealth w and utility u chooses x ∈ B∗ in order to
maximize her expected utility over all states k ∈ K. The maximum expected utility
is then V (u,w, q), given by:
V (u,w, q) = sup
x∈B∗
∑
k
qku(w + xk).
2.5 Acceptance of Information Purchases
The agent with utility function u and wealth w accepts an information purchase
a = (µ, α) if and only if paying µ upfront to receive information according to α
generates an expected utility greater than or equal to staying with wealth w. This
is the case if and only if: ∑
s
pα(s)V (u,w − µ, qsα) ≥ u(w).
10In Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2012), an earlier working paper version of the current work,
we show (in Section 6.6) that this finiteness assumption is not crucial for our results.
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In particular, the agent is small enough so that her acceptance/rejection decision
as well as her investments do not affect prices, or the information available in the
economy. This assumption rules out situations in which agents need to take into
account the strategic consequences of their own actions. In this sense, our framework
fits that of a competitive economy. Also, the right-hand side in the above inequality
implies that the risk-free rate is zero, an assumption that could be easily modified.
3 Risk Aversion and Preference for Information
In order to arrive at the concept of the normalized value of information purchases,
it is useful to first understand which characteristics of an agent’s utility function
make her demand for information increase or decrease. As it turns out, an agent’s
preference for information is determined by her risk aversion.
Our first task is to define what it means for one agent to like information better
than another agent. In general terms, we say that an agent u2 likes information
better than another agent u1 when u2 accepts information more often than u1. In
order to make the concept precise, we need to be careful about the wealth levels at
which we compare the acceptances and rejections of information purchases by u1 and
u2 .
Our concept of uniform preference for information requires agent u2 to accept
the information purchase at all wealth levels whenever u1 accepts it at some wealth
level. That is, “agent u2 uniformly likes information better than agent u1” means
that, whenever agent u1 is interested in purchasing information, it is certain that
agent u2 is also interested.
Definition 1 Agent u2 uniformly likes information better than agent u1 if, for every
pair of wealth levels w1, w2, and for every information purchase a, it is the case that
if u1 accepts a at wealth w1, then u2 accepts a at wealth w2.
10
Alternative concepts of preferences for information and their consequences are
studied in the appendix. Our first result follows:
Theorem 1 Given u1, u2 ∈ U , the following two conditions are equivalent:
1. u2 is uniformly less risk-averse than u1,
2. u2 uniformly likes information better than u1.
The formal proof of the result is in the appendix. Here we provide a verbal and
elementary proof showing that (1) implies (2). As is apparent from this proof, this
implication does not rely on the fact that all no-arbitrage investments are available,
but only on the fact that all available investments have the no-arbitrage property.
Let us assume here that the set of possible investments is an arbitrary closed set B.
Assume that u1 accepts a at wealth w1. For every possible signal s, let xs be
an optimal investment for u1, given signal s and posterior beliefs q
s
α. Starting from
wealth level w1, making the information purchase a, and then making corresponding
investments, is a risky bet that yields an expected utility to agent u1 at least equal to
u1(w1). Therefore, the same risky bet, starting from wealth w2, yields an expected
utility to agent u2 which is at least equal to u2(w2), since this agent is uniformly
less risk-averse than u1. This does not mean, of course, that investment q
s
α after
signal s is optimal for agent u2, but it does imply that, when agent u2 is allowed to
choose investments in B, she obtains an expected utility at least as large as u2(w2).
Therefore, u2 accepts a at w2 as well.
The proof of the converse part is somewhat more involved than that for the direct
part, as one needs to derive a conclusion about the risk-aversion levels of the agents
at all wealth levels, and risk aversion is a local property. In order to prove the result
in the appendix, we rely on information structures that provide “little” information,
on agents who take “small” investments, and thus on situations where only local
properties of utility functions matter.
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Theorem 1 establishes the connection between preference for information and
risk aversion. Lemma 2 in Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2013) shows that an
agent with logarithmic utility agrees to an information purchase whenever a more
risk-averse agent does. Theorem 1 both extends this result to general pairs of utility
functions, and shows that a converse result holds, namely, that an agent whose
preference for information is higher than another must be necessarily less risk-averse.
It is appropriate to underscore the limitations of Theorem 1. Although many
pairs of agents cannot be ranked uniformly by their risk aversion, many other pairs
of agents still can. The result shows that, in our settings, those pairs of agents are
exactly those who can be ranked according to their uniform preference for informa-
tion. Indeed, the result applies in a nonvacuous way only to pairs of utility functions
whose risk aversion levels can be separated by a constant: the risk aversion of u1 for
any wealth level always exceeds a constant, while for u2, it always falls below that
constant. Nonetheless, the economic environments described by our no-arbitrage
condition provide a general framework in which willingness to pay for information
decreases with risk aversion (see Eeckhoudt and Godfroid, 2000, and our literature
review section below).
The following example illustrates the relationship between risk aversion and pref-
erence for information. We do this in a set-up in which all available investments have
the no-arbitrage property. At the same time, not all investments with that property
are available. The direct proof in the example that willingness to pay for information
decreases with risk aversion is already involved. This is true even though the case
featured by the example we consider is the simplest one that is not entirely trivial.
There are only two states of nature and the information structure fully reveals the
state. The difficulty in proving something so simple shows the usefulness of Theo-
rem 1, which, of course, applies to general no-arbitrage investment sets and general
information structures.
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Example 1 Suppose that a businessperson with CARA preferences is deciding whether
or not to invest an amount to support a technology startup in order to do research
on a prototype electric car. There are two states of the world: high (the research
is successful) and low (the research fails). The payoff from not investing is 0 in
both states. The net payoff from investing is G in the high state and −L in the low
state, where G,L > 0 are parameters. We consider an information structure α that
perfectly reveals the state. Assume that the prior probability of the state being low,
denoted by p, is such that:
G (1− p)− Lp < 0,
or, equivalently,
p >
G
G+ L
so that even a risk-neutral agent will not invest in the absence of new information.
The maximal amount that the businessperson with initial wealth w and coefficient of
risk-aversion r is willing to pay for α, denoted I, is independent of w and is given
by the relationship:
exp(−rI) = (1− p) exp (−rG) + p.
Hence, we have:
I = −1
r
(ln(1− p) exp(−rG) + p) .
If we let
f (r) = − ln[(1− p) exp (−rG) + p],
then
I =
f (r)
r
,
but I is then a decreasing function of r. To see this, note first that
∂
(
f(r)
r
)
∂r
=
f ′ (r) r − f (r)
r2
.
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According to the mean value theorem, since f (0) = 0, there is some y ∈ (0, r) such
that
f (r) = f ′ (y) r;
and since f (r) is strictly concave, f ′ (y) r > f ′ (r) r, and thus
∂
(
f(r)
r
)
∂r
=
f ′ (r) r − f ′ (y) r
r2
< 0.
In closing the section, we observe that willingness to pay for information may
not be decreasing with respect to risk aversion if some available investments do not
satisfy the no-arbitrage property.
Example 2 Consider a CARA agent with a coefficient of risk aversion r. The agent
has the option not to invest, or to invest $1 in an asset that pays $10 with probability
0.9 (the state is good) or $0 with probability 0.1 (the state is bad) . The investor
could purchase information at a price µ = $0.50 and learn the state for sure before
investing.
The payoff to the agent who does not purchase the information and always invests
is:
1− 0.9 exp(−9r)− 0.1 exp(r);
the payoff to an agent who purchases the information and invests in the good state
is:
1− 0.9 exp(−8.5r)− 0.1 exp(0.5r);
and the payoff to an agent who does not invest is 0.
It follows that for low degrees of risk aversion such as r < .231, the agent’s optimal
strategy is to invest without purchasing the information. For medium degrees of risk
aversion, r ∈ [.232, 4.60], the optimal strategy is to purchase the information and
invest in the good state. For large degrees of risk aversion, r > 4.61, it is better for
the agent not to purchase the information and never invest.
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Thus, for small to medium degrees of risk aversion, a more risk-averse agent
exhibits a stronger preference for information. Notice how the proposed investment
violates no-arbitrage, as the prior-evaluated expected payoff is positive. The reader
can check how, in this example, our conclusion would still hold if one restores the
no-arbitrage assumption, for instance, by increasing the loss in the bad state.
The example shows that the conclusion in Theorem 1, while applicable to many set-
tings, is not universal. In particular, in cases in which information may be purchased
in order to hedge against risk, for example to hear from experts in order to avoid
large losses, if appropriate assets are not available in the market, more risk-averse
agents may be more willing to pay for information.
4 Preference for Information and a Value for In-
formation Purchases
In this section we propose an objective way to define the normalized value of infor-
mation purchases. The approach is based on ordering preferences for information.
We offer three variants of the same idea, all of them leading to the same normalized-
value index. We present one here and relegate the other two to the appendix, which
also includes an additional approach based on total rejections/acceptances.
Based on the uniform preference for information, as presented in the previous sec-
tion, we move now to define a comparison over information purchases. The definition
formalizes the idea that if an information purchase is accepted by a first agent, then
any purchase that is deemed objectively more valuable should a fortiori be accepted
by an agent who likes information better than the first.11
Definition 2 Let a1, a2 be two information purchases. We say that a1 is uniformly
more valuable than a2 when, given two agents u1, u2 ∈ U such that u1 uniformly likes
11This principle is referred to as “duality” in Aumann and Serrano (2008).
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information better than u2 and for every two wealth levels w1, w2, if agent u2 accepts
a2 at wealth level w2, then agent u1 accepts a1 at wealth level w1.
Note that the requirement of two agents being ordered according to their uniform
preference for information is extremely demanding. According to Theorem 1, it is
equivalent to a situation in which absolute risk aversion –no matter where measured–
is always greater for one agent than for the other. Since this strong requirement is
assumed about the two agents in the definition, the definition itself actually requires
very little. Moreover, what it does require seems very reasonable, namely, we would
expect that agents with a stronger preference for information seek out more highly-
valued pieces of information.
4.1 Normalized Value of Information Purchases
We now present the cardinal formula that characterizes our information ranking.
For two probability distributions p and q, the relative entropy from p to q, also
called their Kulback-Leibler divergence, is an asymmetric measure of their discrep-
ancy. It is defined by the formula:
d(p‖q) =
∑
k
pk ln
pk
qk
.
It is always nonnegative, and equals zero if and only if p = q. It is finite, provided
the support of q contains that of p; it takes the value +∞ otherwise. Thus, p and q
are “maximally different” when q rules out one possibility that p does not.12
Based on the relative entropy, we define the normalized value of an information
purchase a as this quantity:
NV(a) = − 1
µ
ln
(∑
s
pα(s) exp(−d(p‖qsα))
)
. (1)
12If p were the true distribution and q an approximate hypothesis, information theory would view
the relative entropy from p to q as giving the expected number of extra bits that would be required
to code the information if one were to use q instead of p. See, e.g., Kraft (1949) and McMillan
(1956), or Kelly (1956) for a betting-market interpretation.
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In the above formula, and throughout the paper, we use the convention exp(−d(p‖qsα)) =
0 by continuity if d(p‖qsα) = +∞. The normalized value NV(a) of a is thus well-
defined and finite if and only if there exists s such that −d(p‖qsα) is finite, which is
the case if a is nonexcluding. We let NV(a) = +∞ by continuity if a is excluding.
The normalized value of an information purchase decreases with its price and
increases with the relative entropy of the prior to the posterior probabilities. Specif-
ically, the normalized value of an information purchase is measured by the inverse
of its price, multiplied by the natural logarithm of the expected exponentials of the
negative of relative entropy from the prior to each of the generated posterior proba-
bilities.13
As a benchmark for the normalized-value index, note that for all t > 0, NV = t is
the index value for all information purchases which are such that, after every signal
s, the relative entropy d(p||qsα) between the prior p and the posterior qsα is (i) equal to
a constant, and (ii) priced exactly at (1/t) times that constant. In particular, if the
cost of such a purchase is exactly t, NV = 1 includes all those information purchases
that have a relative entropy of t from the prior to each posterior probability.
4.2 Main Result
Theorem 2 Let a1, a2 be two information purchases. The following two statements
are then equivalent:
1. a1 is uniformly more valuable than a2.
13If we ignore the price µ, the rest of the expression in the normalized-value formula is, remarkably,
referred to as “free energy” in theoretical physics (see, e.g., Landau and Lifshitz, 1980), where
relative entropy plays the role of the Hamiltonian of the system. A similar formula appears under
the term “stochastic complexity” in machine learning (Hinton and Zemel, 1994). Similar formulas
appear also in models of rational inattention, where relative entropies are replaced by utilities of
actions less information cost measured by entropy (see, e.g., Stevens, 2016; Matejka and McKay,
2014).
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2.
NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2).
Let us clarify briefly the usefulness of this theorem as a guide for action. Suppose
first that an investor has calculated the normalized value of a purchase (hiring an
information expert), which turns out to be NV1. She also happens to know that
her neighbor, more risk-averse than her, has hired a different information expert.
The neighbor’s purchase has a normalized value of NV2 < NV1. Assume also that
she views herself as a small agent, that she is not interested in investing if no new
information arrives, and that she has access to developed financial markets. Then
she learns from our theorem that she should hire the information expert.
In fact, we show in the next section that the expert hired by the neighbor will
be turned down for sure by any person whose risk aversion is higher than NV2
everywhere. Also, that expert would be hired by those whose risk aversion is lower
than NV2 everywhere. The expert with normalized-value NV1 that our investor is
considering would be turned down by a smaller set of agents in the economy (those
whose risk aversion exceeds NV1 everywhere). That expert would also be hired by
a larger set of investors (with risk aversion lower than NV1 everywhere).
This is obviously far from a unanimous evaluation of one expert versus the other.
That would be the case were they ordered by Blackwell and were they charging the
same price. Nevertheless, our formula and results, which capture the information-
price tradeoff for each expert, become useful benchmarks of analysis for the decision
problem of investors in an environment satisfying our assumptions.
Theorem 2 relies on the relationship between demand for information and risk
aversion, as established in Theorem 1. As we have already seen, it is necessary for
this approach that only no-arbitrage assets be available and that uninformed agents
do not make risky bets. On the other hand, when two information purchases are
compared, not all assets play a role. This, in turn, implies that the assumption that
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all no-arbitrage purchases are available is not necessary when comparing a finite
number of information purchases. See Section 6.6 for more details on this.
Proof. Recall the class of CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility functions.
Given r > 0, let urC be the CARA utility function with parameter r, given by
urC(w) = − exp(−rw) for every w. For a CARA agent with coefficient r and wealth
level w, we consider the problem of the optimal portfolio choice when the agent’s
belief is q. The next lemma shows that the solution is interior when q has full support.
Lemma 1 For every w and r > 0,
1. the optimal portfolio for agent urC and belief q with full support is given by
xk = −1
r
(−d(p‖q) + ln pk
qk
);
2. for every q, the maximum expected utility is:
V (urC , w, q) = − exp( −d(p‖q)− rw).
The proof is elementary and provided in the appendix.
We continue with Lemma 2, which shows that NV(a) can be equivalently defined
as the level of risk aversion of a CARA agent who is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the purchase.
Lemma 2 Let a be an information purchase and w be any wealth level.
1. If r > NV(a), then agent urC rejects a at wealth level w.
2. If r ≤ NV(a), then agent urC accepts a at wealth level w.
Proof. Agent urC accepts a if and only if∑
s
pα(s)V (u
r
C , w − µ, qsα) ≥ urC(w).
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If a is excluding, then the left-hand side of the inequality equals 0, and the inequality
is satisfied for all r and w. If a is nonexcluding, then the agent accepts a if and only
if
− exp(−r(w − µ))
∑
s
pα(s) exp(−d(p‖qsα)) ≥ − exp(−rw).
This is equivalent to
exp(−rµ) ≥
∑
s
pα(s) exp(−d(p‖qsα)),
which in turn is equivalent to r ≤ NV(a). Thus, for r ≤ NV(a), the agent accepts
a at every wealth level, whereas for r > NV(a), the agent rejects a at every wealth
level.
Equipped with Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we now proceed to prove Theorem 2.
First assume that a1 is uniformly more valuable than a2, and thatNV(a2) is finite.
By Lemma 2, a CARA agent with a coefficient of risk aversion NV(a2) accepts a2 at
every wealth level. This agent uniformly likes information better than itself since, by
Lemma 2, acceptance or rejection for CARA agents is independent of wealth. Since
a1 is more valuable than a2, this CARA agent also accepts a1 at every wealth level,
which implies (also by Lemma 2) that NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2).
The case in which NV(a2) is infinite is dealt with similarly: by Lemma 2 every
CARA agent accepts a2 at every wealth level, which implies that the same agent also
accepts a1 at every wealth level. By Lemma 2 again, this implies that we also have
NV(a1) is also infinite.
Now assume that NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2). Consider two agents u1 and u2 such that
u1 uniformly likes information better than u2. Given wealth levels w1 and w2, and
assuming that u2 accepts a2 at w2, we need to prove that u1 accepts a1 at w1. By
Theorem 1 we have R(u1) ≤ R(u2). Since R(u1) > 0 and R(u2) is finite, R(u2) is
positive and finite. Let r = R(u2). Since R(u
C
r ) = r, the agent u
C
r likes information
better than agent u2 does, by Theorem 1; hence the former accepts a2 at any wealth
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level. By Lemma 2 this means that r ≤ NV(a2), and hence also r ≤ NV(a1), so
that uCr also accepts a1 at any wealth level. Since R(u1) ≤ r = R(uCr ) and u1 likes
information better than uCr (also by Theorem 1), it follows that u1 accepts a1 at
wealth level w1.
5 The Demand for Information
In this section we show that, in our settings, the normalized value of an information
purchase is useful for characterizing the demand for information, namely, the set
of agents who are willing to go ahead with any given information purchase. The
first result in this section shows that if the minimum coefficient of absolute risk
aversion of an agent over all levels of wealth is greater than the normalized value
of information, she rejects a purchase independently of her wealth. On the other
hand, if the maximum coefficient of absolute risk aversion of an agent over all levels
of wealth is smaller than the normalized value of information, she accepts a purchase
independently of her wealth. The next theorem follows:
Theorem 3 Consider an information purchase a and an agent u ∈ U .
1. If R(u) > NV(a), then agent u rejects a at all wealth levels.
2. If R(u) ≤ NV(a), then agent u accepts a at all wealth levels.
This simple but important result follows immediately from Lemma 2 and from
the first direction of Theorem 1. This is so because an agent with R(u) ≤ r is
uniformly less risk averse than a CARA agent with risk aversion r, and an agent
with R(u) ≥ r is uniformly more risk-averse than a CARA agent with risk aversion
r.
Parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 3 characterize situations in our settings in which
one can unequivocally say whether or not u accepts a, independent of what one
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knows about the agent’s wealth level. Whenever R(u) > NV(a) ≥ R(u), it may be
the case that agent u accepts a for some wealth levels, and rejects it for other wealth
levels. This observation makes it clear why the normalized-value index NV(a) is not
a universal representation of preferences for information purchases. It is important
to note that this is true only because of such wealth effects.
Another way to look at this result is the following. Imagine that it has been
estimated econometrically that the agents in this economy have a coefficient of risk
aversion ρu(w) ∈ [γ1, γ2] for all relevant w. Then, given an information structure α,
one can identify two prices, µ1 and µ2, as follows:
γ1 = NV(µ1,α), γ2 = NV(µ2,α),
where µ1 and µ2 offer the following interpretation: for prices µ > µ1, the information
purchase (µ, α) will be unanimously rejected, whereas for prices µ < µ2, the pur-
chase will be unanimously accepted. This is the sense in which, for all information
structures, the index of normalized value allows one to identify the minimum and
maximum prices for individuals within a group whose coefficients of risk aversion are
known or at least have been estimated.
More can be said for the case when u is DARA. For DARA utilities, the next result
characterizes utility functions that exhibit unanimous acceptance and unanimous
rejection of a purchase. (The proof is also in the appendix).
Theorem 4 Consider an information purchase a and the class of utility functions
UDA.
1. An agent u ∈ UDA rejects a at all wealth levels if and only if R(u) > NV(a).
2. An agent u ∈ UDA accepts a at all wealth levels if and only if R(u) ≤ NV(a).
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5.1 Examples and Calibrations of the Model
This subsection illustrates the results derived for the demand for information. It
presents some calibrations of the model in order to gauge the magnitudes implied by
the index. Of course, this is meant to be only suggestive, and is far from constituting
a careful empirical analysis.
According to Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011), “Lot-
tery responses and wealth information imply a distribution of CRRA coefficients
mainly between 1 and 10.” People in the lowest quartile of the wealth distribution
in most developed countries has zero or negative net worth (Sierminska, Brandolini,
and Smeeding, 2006) and the wealth of the highest decile ranges from 0.36 (Italy)
to 1.81 (Germany) million US$ (with the US being around 0.95). However, these
figures include very young people who have not yet had time to acquire any assets.
If we use the median wealth instead, the figures go from about US$ 20,000 (Sweden)
to about US$ 120,000 (Italy), with the US being at about US$ 50,000. This means
that a large fraction of the risk aversion of the population in the developed world
can be characterized with R(u) = 5× 10−4 and R(u) = 1.8× 10−6.
Example 3 Let a be an information purchase about a binary state of the world (e.g.,
whether or not the US will be in recession in 2020) where the two states are equally
likely a priori. The information structure α consists of two signals. Conditional
on 1 being received, the probability of a recession is β, and conditional on signal 2
arriving, the probability of recession is 1− β. Then, computation gives:
NV(a) = 1
µ
ln
(
2 (β (1− β))1/2
)
.
Thus, the information purchase a = (µ, α) is accepted by all agents considered, if its
price µ satisfies
µ ≤ − ln
(
2 (β (1− β))1/2
)
× 2× 103.
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Figure 1: Maximum and minimum prices at which information is purchased by agents
in the economy as a function of signal precision β
The same information purchase is rejected by all agents considered, if:
µ > − ln
(
2 (β (1− β))1/2
)
× 5.5× 105.
In the following figure, for every value of β, the information purchase is rejected
by all agents considered, if µ is above the upper curve, and accepted by all agents
considered, if µ is below the lower curve.
Of course, both ranges in the previous example are relatively large, since they
separate the case in which a large portion of the world population would accept
a purchase from the case in which only a few people might. Note, however, that
these ranges provide realistic figures, given that it is not hard to think of pieces
of information with a higher price than the maximum bound, or with a lower price
than the minimum bound. For example, on its website, the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission says this about financial advice: “The cost of the advice
will depend on its scope. As a guide, expect to pay between $200 and $700 for simple
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advice and between $2000 and $4000 for more comprehensive advice.”14 This fits
nicely with the figures in our last example. Future research might be able to provide
a more precise range for information prices as a function of risk aversion estimates
and of different pieces of information, always under the assumption of frictionless
financial markets that allow large investments
6 Some Properties of the Index
We now discuss some properties of our index for the normalized value of informa-
tion.15
6.1 Continuity
The normalized-value index NV is jointly continuous in µ, in pα, and in (qsα)s on
the domain of nonexcluding information purchases. Continuity is a natural and
attractive property: small changes in either the price or the conditional probabilities
of signals should translate into small changes in the normalized value of the purchase.
By “continuity at infinity,” NV(a) is infinite if and only if a is excluding.
6.2 Blackwell Monotonicity
The normalized-value index is Blackwell-monotonic, as expressed in the following
observation:
Observation 1: If an information structure α1 is more informative than another
information structure α2 in the sense of Blackwell, then for any price µ > 0, the
information purchase (µ, α1) is more valuable than the information purchase (µ, α2).
14Taken from: https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/investing/financial-advice/financial-advice-
costs
15Some of the proofs and more properties can be found in the appendix. Addi-
tional properties and examples can be found in the working paper version available at:
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/werepe/we1224.html.
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Thus, we have:
NV(µ, α1) ≥ NV(µ, α2).
This observation shows that the complete ordering defined by the normalized
value is an extension of Blackwell’s ordering over information structures evaluated
at the same price. Since the normalized value is a new ordering, this is also a new
result. Our simple proof of the observation does not rely on the analytical form of
the normalized value function, but rather on its axiomatic underpinning.
6.3 Mixtures
A third property concerns what happens when an information structure is con-
structed by randomizing over two other ones. Given information structures α1, α2,
and 1 > λ > 0, we let λα1 ⊕ (1 − λ)α2 be the information structure in which (i) a
coin toss determines whether the agent’s signal is chosen from α1 (with probability
λ) or from α2 (with probability 1 − λ), and (ii) the agent is informed of both the
outcome of the coin toss and the signal drawn from the chosen information structure.
Formally, the set of signals in λα1⊕ (1−λ)α2 is Sα1 ∪Sα2 (where we assume that Sα1
and Sα2 are disjoint), and the probability in state k that the agent receives signal
s ∈ Sα1 is λα1,k(s), whereas the probability of a signal s ∈ Sα2 is (1− λ)α2,k(s).
Observation 2: Consider µ > 0 and α1, α2 such that NV(µ, α1) ≥ NV(µ, α2). For
every 1 > λ > 0, we have:
NV(µ, α1) ≥ NV(µ, λα1 ⊕ (1− λ)α2) ≥ NV(µ, α2).
Thus, quite naturally, the normalized value of the “mixed” information purchase
lies between the normalized value of the most valuable one and that of the least
valuable one. Here again, the comparison of the values of the normalized index
stems naturally from the “more valuable than” ordering.
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6.4 Comparison with Average Relative Entropy
So far we have seen that two intuitive properties of the index NV are that it is
(i) a decreasing function of its price, and (ii) an increasing function of the relative
entropy from the prior to each generated posterior. In this light, it is interesting to
compare the normalized value with the following index, which simply averages out
all generated relative entropies:
Aˆ(a) =
1
µ
∑
s
pα(s)d(p‖qsα).
It is apparent that this index shares those two properties, and also satisfies sepa-
rability in the form of price homogeneity. The next example shows that the two
indices are, however, fundamentally different. Indeed, the example highlights the
essential nature (for the ordering of purchases) of the combined operation of the
exponential function and its compensating logarithm as a “blow up/shrink down”
of relative entropies. The exponential function with negative exponents, which is
bounded above, avoids the problem of infinite relative entropies attached to a single
signal. Only when all relative entropies are infinite does the logarithm restore an
infinite normalized value. This property is essential in order to satisfy the duality
between uniform preferences for information and the proposed function ranking the
normalized value of purchases.
Example 4 Let K = {1, 2, 3} and fix a uniform prior. Consider, for instance, two
information structures, each of which has two signals:
α1 =
 0 11/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
 , α2 =
1− ε ε1/2 1/2
ε 1− ε

Each row represents the probability of each signal under each possible state: 1, 2, 3.
Fix an arbitrary µ > 0, and define the purchases a1 = (µ, α1) and a2 = (µ, α2).
Note that Aˆ(a1) is infinite because the relative entropy of the prior to the posterior
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generated by the first signal is infinite. On the other hand, for any ε > 0, Aˆ(a2) is
finite. We next argue that the normalized value of the purchases is not well measured
by Aˆ. Indeed, for a small enough ε > 0, the purchase a2 is almost excluding, and
hence, in such a case r1 = NV(a1) < NV(a2) = r2. Here, r1 and r2 are the risk-
aversion coefficients of the two CARA individuals who define the two corresponding
levels of normalized values. Let r = (r1+r2)/2. Clearly, the CARA agent r uniformly
likes information better than the CARA agent r2: the CARA agent r2 accepts a2,
which according to the index Aˆ would be less valuable than a1; but agent r, who
likes information more, rejects a1. This suggests that Aˆ is not measuring value of
information well.
6.5 Comparison with Entropy Informativeness
Several authors (Kelly, 1956; Arrow, 1971; Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano, 2013)
have proposed measuring the informativeness of a statistical experiment by the re-
duction of uncertainty on the state of nature, quantified by its entropy. The following
example compares the rankings generated by our normalized index (when the price
of the purchase is kept constant) and entropy informativeness.
Example 5 Let K = {1, 2, 3} with a uniform prior. Consider the following two
information structures, where rows correspond to states of nature, columns to signals,
and cells to the probability of the signal in the corresponding state:
α1 =
1− ε1 ε11− ε1 ε1
ε1 1− ε1
 , α2 =
1− ε2 ε20.1 0.9
ε2 1− ε2
 .
For ε1 and ε2 small enough, these information structures are not ranked according
to Blackwell. To see this, note that α1 allows one to separate states 2 and 3 with
greater precision than α2 does, while α2 allows one to statistically distinguish between
states 1 and 2, which α1 does not.
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Now let us compare the entropy informativeness for a normalized price of 1:
NV(a1) for a1 = (1, α1) and NV(a2) for a2 = (1, α2):
NV(ai) = − 1
µ
ln
(∑
s
pαi(s) exp(−d(p‖qsαi))
)
.
Taylor approximations give:∑
s
pα1(s) exp(−d(p‖qsα1)) '
2
3
ε
1/3
1 ,∑
s
pα2(s) exp(−d(p‖qsα2)) ' ε1/32 .
If ε1 = ε2 and both are small enough, then NV(a2) < NV(a1). That is, both
purchases are becoming almost excluding at the same rate, but a1 leads to almost
eliminate one more state following the second signal, allowing the investor to make
very aggressive bets against more states. On the other hand, if ε2 = ε
2
1 and both
are small, then NV(a1) < NV(a2). Namely, because of the different rates at which
signal probabilities approach 0, a2 is becoming almost excluding much faster.
Let us now estimate the entropy reduction from the uniform prior, which we
denote by Ie (·). Straightforward computation yields the following:
Ie (α1) ' ln 3− 2
3
(ln 2) ' ln 3− 0.46;
Ie (α2) ' ln 3− 1
3
(1.1 ln 1.1− 0.1 ln 0.1 + 1.9 ln 1.9− 0.9 ln 0.9)
' ln 3− 0.55.
This implies that Ie(α1) > Ie(α2) whenever ε1, ε2 are sufficiently close to zero,
as the generated posteriors by α1 eliminate a greater degree of uncertainty (note the
difference between the two information structures in the second state).
To explore somewhat more systematically the difference between the index based
on entropy and the one in this paper, we investigate conditions for purchases with
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small amounts of information that renders them equivalent. Let ai = (µ, αi). We
then have the following equations:
NV(ai) = − 1
µ
ln
(∑
s
pαi(s) exp
(
−
∑
k
pk
(
ln pk − ln qsαi(k)
)))
Ie (αi) =
∑
s
pαi(s)
(
−
∑
k
pk
(
ln pk − ln qsαi(k)
)−∑
k
(
pk − qsαi(k)
)
ln qsαi (k)
)
.
The two previous expressions imply that, to a first-order approximation when qsαi is
close to p,
NV(ai) ' 1
µ
∑
s
pαi(s)
(∑
k
pk
(
ln pk − ln qsαi(k)
))
;
Ie(αi) '
∑
s
pαi(s)
(
−
∑
k
(
1 + ln qsαi (k)
)
pk
(
ln pk − ln qsαi(k)
))
.
As a result, it follows that:
NV(ai) ' 1
µ
∑
s
pαi(s)
(∑
k
pk
(
ln pk − ln qsαi(k)
))
(2)
and
Ie(αi) '
∑
s
pαi(s)
(
−
∑
k
(
1 + ln qsαi (k)
)
pk
(
ln pk − ln qsαi(k)
))
. (3)
A comparison of expressions (2) and (3) makes it clear that when priors and
posteriors are similar, the two indices point in the same direction - as long as it is
also true that the qsαi (k) vectors are all parallel to the unit vector and that ln q
s
αi
(k) <
−1, that is, when priors are close to uniform and there are more than two states.
Otherwise, cases such as the one provided in Example (5), when posteriors are very
informative, are likely to make the indices diverge.
6.6 On Smaller Investment Sets
Theorem 2, which characterizes demand for information according to our normalized
index, makes the assumption that B∗ consists of all no-arbitrage assets. We show
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here that this assumption is not necessary, as long as the set of available investments
is rich enough.
Consider an information purchase a = (µ, α), and assume that all posterior prob-
abilities following α are in the interior of ∆(K). Depending on the signal s ∈ Sα
received, let xr(s) ∈ B∗ be the optimal investment for a CARA agent with parameter
r given the agent’s posterior belief; also let Xr(a) = {xr(s), s ∈ Sα}.
We now consider an arbitrary set B of no-arbitrage assets, which is not necessarily
the full set B∗. All definitions, including “a1 is more valuable than a2” extend to
the context in which acceptance of an information purchase depends on the set of
available assets. The two results that follow provide counterparts to Theorem 2,
while relaxing the assumptions made on the set of available assets.
Proposition 1 Consider two information purchases a1 and a2, and assume that
NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2). If B contains Xr(a1) for some r ∈ [NV(a2),NV(a1)], then a1
is more valuable than a2 given the investment set B.
Proof. Assume agent u2 accepts a2 at wealth w2, given the available set B. Agent
u2 also accepts a2 at w2 if B
∗ is available; hence, R(u2) ≤ NV(a2) ≤ r ≤ NV(a1).
A CARA agent with risk aversion r accepts a1, given either B
∗ or B, since only
investments in B are chosen by this agent. Now, any agent u1 who likes information
better than u2 satisfies R(u1) ≤ r. Hence, this agent u1 also accepts a1 given B.
The following is an extension of the converse part of our main result:
Proposition 2 Consider two information purchases a1 and a2, and assume that a1
is more valuable than a2 given some investment set B. If B contains BNV(a2)(a2),
then NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2).
Proof. A CARA agent with risk aversion NV(a2) accepts a2 under B. Thus, this
same agent accepts a1 under B, which implies that she also accepts a1 under B
∗,
which implies that NV(a2) ≤ NV(a1).
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Of course, in general, rankings of information purchases may depend on invest-
ments available. But, as shown by the previous results, as long as enough investments
are available, the ranking between any two information purchases is unambiguous,
and is represented by our normalized-value index.
7 Related Literature
The classical approach to ranking information structures is due to Blackwell (1953).16
However, this approach does not provide a complete ordering of information struc-
tures. For an information structure to be more informative in the sense of Blackwell
than another one, it must be the case that agents (weakly) prefer the former over
the latter no matter what their preferences are. More recent research has focused on
restricting preferences to a particular class. For example, Lehmann (1988) restricts
attention to problems with monotone decision rules, and Persico (2000), Athey and
Levin (2001), and Jewitt (2007) focus on some more general classes of monotone
problems.17 The main difference between this line of research and our approach
is that we provide a complete order through a duality axiom for problems with a
restricted set of investment opportunities.18
Working independently, several authors (Kelly, 1956; Arrow, 1971; Cabrales,
Gossner, and Serrano, 2013) have studied a complete ordering of information struc-
tures, indexed by the reduction of uncertainty on the state of nature due to the
signal, as measured by entropy. All three papers hinge on the fact that entropy
measures the value of information for a logarithmic utility investor. Arrow (1971)
simply assumes such an investor. Kelly (1956) shows that when investment oppor-
16Veldkamp (2011) shows the many ways in which economists have measured informativeness
and their applications.
17Measuring information is even harder if several agents interact, as shown, for instance in,
Gossner (2000), Gossner and Mertens (2001), and Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006).
18Moscarini and Smith (2002), Azrieli (2014), and Ganuza and Penalva (2010) also study partial
orderings of information structures in various environments.
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tunities are repeatedly available, the betting strategy that maximizes the growth of
long-run wealth is the one that maximizes instantaneous expected logarithmic utility.
Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2013) measure the value of an information source
by the maximal price that an agent in the economy is willing to pay to access it, and
the logarithmic agent is characterized as having the maximum willingness to pay for
information.19, 20
The present paper departs from this literature in several ways. First, we offer
a way to measure not just information, but an information purchase, thus adding
the price of information into the object of study. To the best of our knowledge,
ours is the first index capturing this tradeoff. Second, a perhaps more important
argument is that in our methodology, instead of studying the value of information to
one particular agent, we obtain an index that captures demand for information, in
the sense that larger values of the index correspond to larger sets of agents accepting
the corresponding purchases.
Prior literature has investigated the relationship between risk aversion and de-
mand for information. Freixas and Kihlstrom (1984) study an environment in which
a consumer with CARA preferences decides which variety of a horizontally differen-
tiated good to consume. The consumer can obtain a normally distributed signal that
would add precision to her knowledge. The paper shows that the willingness to pay
for information in that environment decreases with risk aversion.21 Eeckhoudt and
Godfroid (2000) assert at the beginning of their paper, “It is widely believed among
economists and businessmen that increases in risk or in risk aversion should increase
19This is related to the fact that this is also the least risk-averse agent in the economy considered.
20Samuelson (1969) had already discussed Kelly (1956) and the properties of logarithmic utility
investing, and Blume and Easley (2002) the potential for the dominance in a market in the long
run of “Kelly investors”. A good summary on “Kelly investing” is MacLean, Thorp, and Ziemba
(2011). Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006) note the formal equivalence between sequential gambling
and forecasting under the logarithmic loss function.
21Alepuz and Urbano (1995) study the experimentation problem of a monopolist who is trying
to learn the slope of her (linear) demand. They show that for small experimentation costs, CARA
agents who are more risk-averse experiment less than do less risk-averse agents.
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the value of information for decision-makers.” Then they provide an example of a
decision problem in which the optimal decision in the absence of information is not
to invest, and in which the value of information falls with increasing risk aversion.
We view our work as providing a general framework for thinking about the demand
for information, and thereby extending further the logic of their example.
Finally, our approach to ranking information purchases is based on a ranking
of preferences for information. Relatively few papers in the literature deal with the
comparison of different agents’ preferences for information. One such study is Grant,
Kajii, and Polak (1998), which explores intrinsic preferences for information, that is,
preferences that are unrelated to the fact that information can lead to more profitable
decisions. This is very different from our framework, since our agents like information
precisely because it helps them to make better decisions. But, interestingly, just as
we found (see Theorem 1) that risk aversion is related to preferences for information,
Grant, Kajii, and Polak (1998) find that their notion of Information Loving is related
to the convexity of preferences.
8 Conclusion
There are multiple ways to index information, but ours is the first index that captures
the information-price tradeoff, by indexing information purchases. Our normalized-
value index is based on a duality principle (as in Aumann and Serrano (2008))
between value and preference for information in settings in which the investment
opportunities are described by a no-arbitrage condition. Because no-arbitrage assets
provide a clean way to measure the value of information, we have been able to extend
their use from such previous studies as (Kelly, 1956; Arrow, 1971; Cabrales, Gossner,
and Serrano, 2013). The result we offer here can be viewed as a translation of
Aumann and Serrano (2008) to informational settings with no-arbitrage investments.
In such settings, the new index captures an aspect of the demand for information
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in a market economy. Our paper has characterized agents’ demand for information
using a simply computable number called the normalized value of the information
purchase, which relates to agents’ risk aversion. For practical applications, one can
rely on some of the known estimates for risk aversion levels provided in the literature
in order to identify prices at which every agent–no agent–will accept that information
purchase. In this way we can describe a useful inverse demand curve for information
in no-arbitrage investment settings.
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Appendix For Online Publication
This appendix presents additional material, both completing or providing proofs
of results stated in the text of the paper, as well as expansions of some of the
concepts presented. We order the sections in the appendix following the logical
order of appearance in the paper.
A Proof of Theorem 1
(1) implies (2)
We start by providing a formal proof that (1) implies (2). Assume that R(u2) ≤
R(u1). For every z, w1, and w2, we have
u′′1(w1 + z)
u′1(w1 + z)
≤ u
′′
2(w2 + z)
u′2(w2 + z)
.
By integration on z, we have:{
lnu′1(w1 + z)− lnu′1(w1) ≤ lnu′2(w2 + z)− lnu′2(w2) if z ≥ 0;
lnu′1(w1 + z)− lnu′1(w1) ≥ lnu′2(w2 + z)− lnu′2(w2) if z ≤ 0;
which is the same as: {
u′1(w1+z)
u′1(w1)
≤ u′2(w2+z)
u′2(w2)
if z ≥ 0;
u′1(w1+z)
u′1(w1)
≥ u′2(w2+z)
u′2(w2)
if z ≤ 0.
By a second integration on z, for every z:
u1(w1 + z)− u1(w1)
u′1(w1)
≤ u2(w2 + z)− u2(w2)
u′2(w2)
. (4)
Thus, for every q ∈ ∆(K) and µ ≥ 0:
V (u1, w1 − µ, q)− u1(w1)
u′1(w1)
≤ V (u2, w2 − µ, q)− u2(w2)
u′2(w2)
.
And finally, for every information structure α,∑
s pα(s)V (u1, w1 − µ, qsk)− u1(w1)
u′1(w1)
≤
∑
s pα(s)V (u2, w2 − µ, qsk)− u2(w2)
u′2(w2)
.
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This implies that for every w1, w2, if u1 accepts a = (µ, α) at wealth w1, then u2 also
accepts it at wealth w2.
22
(2) implies (1)
We begin the proof of the converse part of the theorem by stating and proving
several auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 3 Fix p and consider a sequence qn of beliefs such that qn → p. Let xn
be the optimal investment for an agent with beliefs qn. Then, it must be true that
xn → 0.
Proof. If the property does not hold, there exists a sequence qn → p and a cor-
responding sequence of optimal investments xn together with ε > 0 such that, for
every n, ‖xn‖∞ ≥ ε. Since u is strictly concave, there exists a > 0 such that for
every z with |z| ≥ ε,
u(w + z) ≤ u(w) + zu′(w)− a|z|.
We then have for every n:
V (u,w, qn) =
∑
k
qnku(w + x
n
k)
≤
∑
|xnk |<ε
qnk (u(w) + u
′(w)xnk) +
∑
|xnk |≥ε
qnk (u(w) + u
′(w)xnk − a|xnk |)
= u(w) +
∑
|xnk |<ε
(qnk − pnk)u′(w)xnk +
∑
|xnk |≥ε
((qnk − pnk)u′(w)xnk − aqnk |xnk |) ,
where the last equality uses
∑
k q
n
k = 1 and
∑
k p
n
kx
n
k = 0. This implies both
lim
n→∞
∑
|xnk |<ε
(qnk − pnk)u′(w)xnk = 0
22This statement follows from 4.1.2. in Aumann and Serrano (2008).
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and
lim sup
n→∞
∑
|xnk |≥ε
(qnk − pnk)u′(w)xnk − aqnk |xnk | < 0,
since for every n, there exists k such that |xnn| ≥ ε. This shows that
lim sup
n→∞
V (u,w, qn) < u(w),
which is in contradiction with V (u,w, q) ≥ u(w) for every q. We conclude that the
property holds as claimed.
Lemma 4 Fix p and consider q close to p. Then, the optimal investment x(q) =
(xk(q))k∈K for an agent with belief q = (qk)k∈K is
xk(q) =
1
pkρ(w)
(qk − pk) + o(‖q − p‖).
Proof. The agent’s problem is to maximize
∑
k qku(w + xk) under the constraint∑
k pkxk = 0. The solution is uniquely given by the system of first-order conditions:
qku
′(w + xk) = λpk,
where λ is independent of k. Using a first order Taylor expansion of u′(w + xk), we
obtain:
u′(w) + xku′′(w) = λ
pk
qk
+ o(xk). (5)
We multiply each equation by pk and sum over k to get:
u′(w) = λ
∑
j
p2j
qj
+ o(x). (6)
We replace the value of λ obtained using (6) into equation (5) and get:
xk =
u′(w)
u′′(w)
(
pk
qk
∑
j
p2j
qj
− 1) + o(xk).
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In vector form, this can be expressed as:
x = F (q) + γ(x),
where (F (q))k =
u′(w)
u′′(w)(
pk
qk
∑
j
p2
j
qj
−1) and γ(x) ∈ RK is such that ‖γ(x)‖‖x‖ → 0 as ‖x‖ → 0.
We now show that ‖x‖ = O(‖q − p‖). Assume to the contrary that there exists
a sequence qn → p and a corresponding sequence xn such that ‖xn‖‖qn−pn‖ → ∞. We
would then have:
‖xn‖
‖qn − pn‖ ≤
‖F (qn)‖
‖qn − pn‖ +
γ(xn)
‖xn‖
‖xn‖
‖qn − pn‖ .
However, a simple computation shows that ‖F (qn)‖ = O(‖qn − pn‖), and we know
from Lemma 3 that ‖xn‖ → 0; hence, γ(xn)‖xn‖ → 0. This yields a contradiction, and
hence the conclusion that ‖x‖ = O(‖q − p‖).
We thus have γ(x)‖q−p‖ → 0 as ‖q − p‖ → 0. We can therefore write
xk =
u′(w)
u′′(w)
(
pk
qk
∑
j
p2j
qj
− 1) + o(‖q − p‖)
=
1
ρ(w)
(
qk
∑
j
p2j
qj
− pk
qk
∑
j
p2j
qj
) + o(‖q − p‖)
=
1
pkρ(w)
(qk − pk) + o(‖q − p‖),
where the last line uses the fact that limq→p
∑
j
p2j
qj
= 1.
Lemma 5 Fix p and consider q close to p. Then,
V (u,w, q) = u(w) +
1
2
∑
k
(qk − pk)2
ρ(w)pk
u′(w) + o(‖q − p‖2).
Proof. We have
V (u,w, q) =
∑
k
qku(w + xk),
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where x = (xk)k∈K is defined as in Lemma 4. A second order Taylor expansion gives
V (u,w, q) = u(w) +
∑
k
qkxku
′(w) +
1
2
∑
k
qkx
2
ku
′′(w) + o(‖x‖2)
= u(w) +
∑
k
(qk − pk)xku′(w) + 1
2
∑
k
qkx
2
ku
′′(w) + o(‖x‖2).
From Lemma 4 we know that ‖x‖ = O(‖q − p‖). Hence, we can replace o(‖x‖2) by
o(‖p− q‖2) in the expression above. By substituting xk for the expression in Lemma
4 we obtain:
V (u,w, q) = u(w) +
∑
k
(qk − pk)2
ρ(w)pk
u′(w)
+
1
2
∑
k
qk
ρ(w)2p2k
(qk − pk)2u′′(w) + o(‖q − p‖2)
= u(w) +
1
2
∑
k
(qk − pk)2
ρ(w)pk
u′(w) + o(‖q − p‖2),
which is as claimed.
Fix p, and two states k, l ∈ K. For min{pk, pl} > ε > 0, let qε,k be given by
qε,kk′ = pk′ for k
′ 6= k, l; qε,kk = pk + ε; and qε,kl = pl − ε. Similarly, qε,l is given by
qε,lk′ = pk′ for k
′ 6= k, l; qε,ll = pl + ε; and qε,lk = pk − ε. Thus, the belief qε,k gives
slightly higher weight to state k and slightly lower weight to state l than p, whereas
qε,l does the opposite. Now consider an information structure α(ε) such that with
probability 1
2
, the agent’s posterior is qε,k; and with probability 1
2
it is qε,l.(Such an
information structure exists since 1
2
qε,k + 1
2
qε,l = p.)
Lemma 6 For ε close to 0, the maximal price µ(ε) that an agent is willing to pay
for α(ε) is:
µ(ε) =
pk + pl
2ρ(w)pkpl
ε2 + o(ε2).
Proof. The maximal price µ(ε) is such that the informational gains exactly com-
pensate the monetary loss. Such a price satisfies the equation:
1
2
(
V (u,w − µ(ε), qε,k) + V (u,w − µ(ε), qε,l)) = u(w).
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Relying on Lemma 5, we get:
u(w)− u(w − µ(ε)) = u
′(w − µ(ε))
2ρ(w − µ(ε))(
ε2
pk
+
ε2
pl
) + o(ε2).
This shows that µ(ε) → 0 as ε → 0, and therefore, by taking a first-order Taylor
approximation of u(w − µ(ε)), we obtain:
µ(ε)u′(w) + o(µ(ε)) =
u′(w)
2ρ(w)
pk + pl
pkpl
ε2 + o(ε2).
We conclude that:
µ(ε) =
pk + pl
2ρ(w)pkpl
ε2 + o(ε2),
as we wanted to show.
Therefore, to prove the converse statement in the theorem, assume that u2 uni-
formly likes information better than u1, that is, for any two wealth levels w1, w2, if
u1 accepts an information purchase at w1, then u2 accepts this information purchase
at w2. To prove that u2 is less risk-averse at w2 than u1 is at w1, which is a local
property at w1, w2, the proof relies on information structures α(ε), which are “little
informative”, hence induce small investments. Lemma 6 characterizes the amount
that an agent is willing to pay for “small information”, and we obtain in our case
that for every w1, w2 and for a small enough ε > 0,
pk + pl
2ρu2(w2)pkpl
ε2 ≥ pk + pl
2ρu1(w1)pkpl
ε2.
Hence, ρu2(w2) ≤ ρu1(w1), which implies R(u2) ≤ R(u1). The proof is thus complete.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Part 1: The agent’s objective is to maximize∑
k
qk exp(−r(w + xk)),
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subject to the constraint
∑
k pkxk = 0. The first-order condition shows that
qk exp(−rxk) = λpk,
where λ is independent of k. We then have, for every k,
−rxk = lnλ+ ln pk
qk
.
Summing over these expressions, after we multiply each of them by pk, gives
0 = ln(λ) + d(p‖q),
and hence, the result.
Part 2: First, assume that q has full support; hence, d(p‖q) is finite. Using the
optimal-portfolio characterization in Part 1 of the current lemma, we obtain:
V (urC , w, q) =
∑
k
qk exp(−r(w + xk))
= exp(−rw)
∑
k
qk exp(−d(p‖q) + ln pk
qk
)
= exp(−rw − d(p‖q))
∑
k
qk
pk
qk
= exp(−rw − d(p‖q)).
Now assume that qk0 = 0 for some k0; hence, d(p‖q) = +∞. The investment x0 given
by : {
x0k0 = −
1−pk0
pk0
;
xk = 1 if k 6= k0
is such that λx0 ∈ B∗ for every λ ≥ 0. For every such λ, we have
V (urC , w, q) ≥
∑
k
qku
r
C(w + λx
0
k)
= urC(w)
= exp(−r(w + λ)).
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Since limλ→∞ exp(−r(w + λ)) = 0, we have V (urC , w, q) ≥ 0. On the other hand,
V (urC , w, q) ≤ supz urC(z) = 0. The desired conclusion is therefore that V (urC , w, q) =
0.
C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof.
1. Let r = NV(a). Assume R(u) ≥ NV(a). Since u is DARA, ρu(w) > NV(a)
for every w. The same computation as in the proof of Theorem 1 shows that
for every z,
u(w + z)− u(w)
u′(w)
<
urC(w + z)− urC(w)
ur′C(w)
.
If q has full support, the solution to the maximization problem of
∑
k qku(w+
xk) under the constraint
∑
k pkxk ≤ 0 is interior. Let x(q) achieve this maxi-
mum. We have:
V (u,w − µ, q)− u(w)
u′(w)
=
∑
k qku(w − µ+ xk(q))− u(w)
u′(w)
<
∑
k qku
r
C(w − µ+ xk(q))− urC(w)
ur′C(w)
≤ V (u
r
C , w − µ, q)− urC(w)
ur′C(w)
.
If q does not have full support, we still have:
V (u,w − µ, q)− u(w)
u′(w)
= sup
x∈B∗
∑
k qku(w − µ+ xk)− u(w)
u′(w)
≤ sup
x∈B∗
∑
k qku
r
C(w − µ+ xk(q))− urC(w)
ur′C(w)
≤ V (u
r
C , w − µ, q)− urC(w)
ur′C(w)
.
Note that NV(a) ≤ r implies that NV(a) is finite, and hence that a is nonex-
cluding; therefore, there exists s such that pα(s) > 0 and q
s has full support.
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Hence:∑
s pα(s)V (u,w − µ, qs)− u(w)
u′(w)
<
∑
s pα(s)V (u
r
C , w − µ, qs)− urC(w)
ur′C(w)
= 0,
where the last equality stems from the fact that the agent urC is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting the information purchase a. We conclude that
agent u rejects a at wealth level w.
Now, assume that R(u) < r and choose r0 such that R(u) < r0 < r. Since an
agent urC accepts a at any wealth level, an agent u
r0
C strictly prefers accepting
a at wealth level 0, which can be expressed as:
1−
∑
s
pα(s) sup
bs∈B∗
∑
k
qsk exp(r0(µ+ x
s
k)) > 0.
Let (xs)s then be a family of elements in B
∗ such that:
1−
∑
s
pα(s)
∑
k
qsk exp(r0(µ+ x
s
k)) > 0.
Let w be such that ρ(w − µ + mins,k qsk) < r0. We have ρ(z) < r0 for every
z ≥ w− µ+ mins,k qsk. It follows that by the same computation as in the proof
of Theorem 1, for every s, k:
u(w − µ+ xsk)− u(w)
u′(w)
≥ u
r0
C (−µ+ xsk)− ur0C (0)
ur0′C (0)
.
Therefore:∑
s pα(s)V (u,w − µ, qsα)− u(w)
u′(w)
≥
∑
s pα(s)
∑
k q
s
ku(w − µ+ xsk)− u(w)
u′(w)
≥
∑
s pα(s)
∑
k q
s
ku
r0
C (−µ+ xsk)− ur0C (0)
ur0′C (0)
> 0.
Hence, u accepts a at wealth w.
2. Analogous.
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D Further Justifications of the Index
D.1 Other Duality-Based Approaches
Since rankings of preferences for information are of interest in their own right, we
examine two alternative definitions thereof, one of which being a complete order-
ing over agents with decreasing risk aversion. It will be apparent that the ranking
introduced in Section 4 and the two alternative rankings introduced next differ sig-
nificantly. Next, following a parallel approach to Definition 2, we define orderings
of information purchases according to the “duality” axiom of Aumann and Serrano
(2008), a monotonicity property with respect to each of the alternatives concerning
preferences for information.
The second definition of a ranking for preferences for information requires agent
u1 to accept the information purchase at some wealth level whenever u2 accepts it
at some wealth level. This is thus weaker than the definition of uniformly liking
information better that requires u1 to accept the information at all wealth levels
whenever u2 accepts it at some wealth level. We restrict attention to agents who are
in the class UDA of utility functions.
Let u1, u2 ∈ UDA. We say that u1 minimally likes information better than u2 if,
for every information purchase a, and for every w2, there exists w1 such that, if u2
accepts a at w2, then so does u1 at w1.
This definition is an extremely weak requirement and it orders a large set of
agents, as will be shown shortly.
Our third definition requires the wealth levels at which u1 and u2 are compared
to be identical. It allows utilities to be defined over any bounded or unbounded
open interval. We let U IDA be the class of utility functions u that are defined over an
open interval of R, twice differentiable, and such that ρu is decreasing. The following
definition is general in that it allows the wealth intervals on which the two compared
utility functions are defined to differ.
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Let u1, u2 ∈ U IDA, with u1 defined over I1 and u2 over I2. We say that u1 wealth
wise likes information better than u2 if I1 ⊇ I2 and, for every information purchase
a and wealth level w, if u2 accepts a at w, then so does u1.
For agent u1 to wealth wise like information better than u2, it is required that u1
accepts information purchases more often than u2, when the comparison holds at the
same wealth level. Since u1 cannot accept information purchases for wealth levels
outside of I1, it is necessary that that I1 is a superset of I2. It is therefore implicit in
the last definition that the agent rejects all information purchases that would make
the wealth after purchase w − µ lie outside of the domain of the utility function u.
The following Theorem characterizes the orderings of these two definitions in
terms of levels of risk aversion, and it should be compared with Theorem 1.
Theorem 5 1. Let u1, u2 ∈ UDA, u1 minimally likes information better than u2
if and only if:
R(u1) ≤ R(u2).
2. Let u1, u2 ∈ U IDA, with respective domains I1 and I2, I1 ⊇ I2. Then, u1 wealth
wise likes information better than u2 if and only if
∀w ∈ I2, ρu1(w) ≤ ρu2(w).
Proof. Point 1 is a direct consequence of Theorem 4. Point 2 follows from similar
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1.
In particular, some consequences of Theorem 5 are that the “minimally likes
information” ordering is complete over the set of DARA agents, and that the uniform
ordering is stronger than the wealth wise ordering which is itself stronger than the
minimal ordering.
We now define orderings of information purchases according to “duality” with
regards to the orderings on preferences for information. The two following definitions
parallel Definition 2.
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First, using the “minimally likes information better” ordering:
Definition 3 Let a1, a2 be two information purchases. We say that a1 is minimally
more valuable than a2 if, given two agents u1, u2 ∈ UDA such that u1 minimally
likes information better than u2, whenever u2 accepts a2 at some wealth level, u1 also
accepts a1 at some wealth level.
And second, relying on the “wealth wise likes information better” ordering:
Definition 4 Let a1, a2 be two information purchases. We say that a1 is wealth
wise more valuable than a2 if, for every u2 ∈ U IDA, and u2 ∈ UDA such that u1 wealth
wise likes information better than u2, if u2 accepts a2 at some wealth level, u1 also
accepts a1 at some wealth level.
This definition requires the set of agents u1 who accept a1 at some wealth level
to be neither too large, nor too small. This set is potentially smaller than the set of
agents in U IDA who like information better than u2, but it has to include all elements
of UDA who like information better than u2.
Theorem 6 below states the characterization of these orderings over information
purchases.
Theorem 6 Let a1, a2 be two information purchases. The following three statements
are equivalent:
1. a1 is uniformly more valuable than a2,
2. a1 is minimally more valuable than a2,
3. a1 is wealth wise more valuable than a2.
And in particular, they are all equivalent to:
NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2).
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Proof. The equivalence between the uniformly more valuable ordering and the
normalized value is proved in Theorem 2.
We next prove that a1 is minimally more valuable than a2 if and only if NV(a1) ≥
NV(a2). Assume that a1 is minimally more valuable than a2. Consider a CARA
agent with risk aversion level r = NV(a2), such an agent accepts a2 at all (hence
some) wealth levels. The same agent must also accept a1 at some wealth level, which
by Theorem 4 implies that NV(a2) = r ≤ NV(a1). Now assume NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2),
and consider u1 ∈ UDA who minimally likes information better than u2 ∈ UDA. If u2
accepts a2 at some wealth level, Theorem 5 and Theorem 4 imply R(u1) ≤ R(u2) ≤
NV(a2) ≤ NV(a1), hence u1 accepts a1 at some wealth level.
Now we prove that a1 is wealth wise more valuable than a2 if and only ifNV(a1) ≥
NV(a2). Assume that a1 is wealth wise more valuable than a2. Again, a CARA agent
with risk aversion level NV(a2)−ε for any ε > 0 accepts a2 at some wealth level. The
same agent (being in UDA) also accepts a1 at some wealth level, which by Theorem 4
implies that NV(a2) ≤ NV(a1). Finally, assume that NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2). Consider
u1 ∈ UDA who wealth wise likes information better than u2 ∈ UDA, both defined on
an open interval I and assume that u2 accepts a2 at some wealth level w ∈ I. A
CARA agent with degree of risk aversion infI ρu2(w) is wealth wise less risk averse
than u2 by Theorem 5, hence accepts a2 at all wealth levels, and hence, also at w.
Since u1 is wealth wise less risk-averse than u2, R(u1) ≤ infI ρu1(w) ≤ infI ρu2(w).
Hence R(u1) ≤ infI ρu2(w) ≤ NV(a2) ≤ NV(a1), which implies that u1 accepts a1
at some wealth level.
D.2 Total Rejections or Acceptances
In this subsection we provide a result in the spirit of Hart (2011), together with a
similar result based on the notion of “accepting for all w” (instead of “rejecting for
all w”.
Following Hart (2011)’s approach (see also Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano, 2013),
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we now introduce the definitions of uniform wealth rejection and acceptance:
Definition 5 Let a1 and a2 be two information purchases. We say that a2 is uni-
formly more rejected than a1 if any u ∈ UDA that rejects a1 at all wealth levels also
rejects a2 at all wealth levels. We say that a1 is uniformly more accepted than a2 if
any u ∈ UDA that accepts a2 at all wealth levels also accepts a1 at all wealth levels.
The first part of the definition proposes a uniform rejection of purchases within
the DARA class of preferences. That is, a2 is uniformly more rejected than a1 because
the former is rejected more often: whenever a1 is rejected at all wealth levels, so is a2,
but not vice versa. The second part of the definition proposes a uniform acceptance
of purchases within the same class of preferences. That is, a2 is uniformly more
accepted than a1 because the former is accepted more often: whenever a1 is accepted
at all wealth levels, so is a2, but not vice versa. The definition leads to the following
result:23
Theorem 7 Let a1 and a2 be two information purchases. The following three con-
ditions are equivalent:
• a2 is uniformly more rejected than a1
• a1 is uniformly more accepted than a2
• NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2).
Proof. Assume that a2 is uniformly more rejected than a1. For every ε > 0,
Theorem 4 shows that an agent u
NV(a1)+ε
C rejects a1 at all wealth levels. Hence
such an agent also rejects a2 at all wealth levels, which implies, again by Theorem
23We observe that the same theorem holds if we restrict the class of functions by imposing IRRA
and ruin aversion on top of DARA. IRRA and ruin aversion are the restrictions on preferences used
in Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2013).
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4, that NV(a1) + ε ≥ A(a2). Since this is true for every ε > 0, it follows that
NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2).
For the converse, assume that NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2), and that u ∈ UDA rejects a1 at
all wealth levels. Then by Theorem 4, R(u) ≥ NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2), and u also rejects
a2 at all wealth levels.
Assume that a1 is uniformly more accepted than a2. For every ε > 0, Theorem
4 shows that an agent u
NV(a2)−ε
C accepts a2 at all wealth levels. Hence such an
agent also rejects a1 at all wealth levels, which implies, again by Theorem 4, that
NV(a2) − ε ≤ A(a1). Since this is true for every ε > 0, it follows that NV(a2) ≤
NV(a1).
For the converse, assume that NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2), and that u ∈ UDA accepts a2
at all wealth levels. Then by Theorem 4, NV(a1) ≥ NV(a2) ≥ R(u), and u also
accepts a1 at all wealth levels.
E Additional Material Concerning Properties of
the Index
E.1 Proof of Observation 1 (Blackwell Monotonicity)
Proof. Assuming that α1 is more informative than α2 in the sense of Blackwell,
and fixing any arbitrary wealth level w, then any CARA agent who rejects (µ, α1)
at wealth level w also rejects (µ, α2) at wealth level w. It follows from the charac-
terization of NV in Theorem 2 that NV(µ, α1) ≥ NV(µ, α2).
E.2 Proof of Observation 2 (Mixtures)
Proof. Fix any wealth level. From Lemma 2, a CARA agent with coefficient of risk
aversion NV(µ, α2) accepts both purchases (µ, α1) and (µ, α2) at any wealth w; this
agent therefore also accepts the purchase (µ, λα1 ⊕ (1 − λ)α2) at that wealth level.
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This shows that
NV(µ, λα1 ⊕ (1− λ)α2) ≥ NV(µ, α2).
Now consider ε > 0. Again from Lemma 2, a CARA agent with coefficient of risk
aversion NV(µ, α1) + ε rejects both purchases (µ, α1) and (µ, α2) at wealth w; this
agent therefore also rejects the purchase (µ, λα1 ⊕ (1 − λ)α2) at that wealth level.
This shows that
NV(µ, α1) + ε ≥ NV(µ, λα1 ⊕ (1− λ)α2)
for every ε > 0, and hence that
NV(µ, α1) ≥ NV(µ, λα1 ⊕ (1− λ)α2).
E.3 The Role of Prices and Priors
In the model of Section 2, p plays a dual role. Indeed, p is the agent’s prior before
she receives any information, and it is also a vector of prices for Arrow securities that
defines the set of no-arbitrage assets B∗. In order to both allow for the agent’s prior
to be different from the price system, and disentangle the two roles of p, we consider
here agents whose prior belief q ∈ ∆(K) may differ from the vector p defining the
set B∗.
In this more general model, an agent accepts an information purchase a = (µ, α)
at prior q if and only if:∑
s
qα(s)V (u,w − µ, qsα) ≥ V (u,w, q),
where qsα is the agent’s posterior belief after receiving a signal s given the prior q
and qα(s) =
∑
k qkαk(s). Note that if q = p, then V (u,w, q) equals u(w) so that the
definition particularizes to the original one in this case.24
24It is convenient to write the RHS of this expression this way, given our analysis of sequential
purchases in the next subsection.
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Our Definition 2 extends as follows: We say that a1 is more valuable than a2 at
prior q if, given two agents u1, u2 such that u1 uniformly likes information better
than u2 and two wealth levels w1, w2, whenever agent u2 accepts a2 at wealth level
w2 and prior q, then agent u1 accepts a1 at wealth level w1 and prior q.
Then, we define the normalized value of an information purchase a = (µ, α) at
prior q as:
NV(a, q) = − 1
µ
ln
(∑
s
pα(s) exp(−d(p‖qsα))
)
− d(p‖q)
µ
= NV(a)− d(p‖q)
µ
.
As a word of caution, we note that in the formula above, as (qsα)s depends on q, so
does NV(a). Our results can be extended to this more general setting in the way
one should expect (we omit details for brevity).
E.4 Sequential Purchases
Another property worth mentioning concerns the normalized value of an information
purchase in which the buyer receives signals sequentially from different information
structures. Given an information structure α with a set of signals Sα and a family
β = (βs)s∈Sα of information structures, where all the members of β share the same
set of signals Sβ, we let (α, β) be the information structure in which the agent first
receives a signal s from α, then an independently drawn (conditional on k) signal s′
from βs. Formally, the set of signals in (α, β) is Sα×Sβ, and in state k, the probability
of receiving the pair of signals (s, s′) is αk(s)βs,k(s′). Given an information purchase
a = (µ, α) and a family of information purchases b = (xs)s = (ν, βs)s, where all the
members of b have the same price ν, we let a + b denote the information purchase
(µ+ ν, (α, β)).
Observation 3: Given information purchases a and x = (x1, . . . , xs, . . . , xK), the
following hold:
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1. If for every s, NV(xs, qs) ≥ NV(a), then NV(a+ x) ≥ NV(a).
2. If for every s, NV(xs, qs) ≤ NV(a), then NV(a+ x) ≤ NV(a).
3. In particular, if for every s, NV(xs, qs) = NV(a), then NV(a+ x) = NV(a).
Proof. We prove the observation using the following auxiliary decision problem. In
the first stage, the agent can either accept information purchase a or reject it. If the
agent accepts a, then a signal s is drawn from α and the agent can either accept
the information purchase xs or reject it. If the agent rejects a, no other information
purchase is offered to the agent. Once the agent has acquired some information (or
none), any asset in B∗ may be purchased; then the state k is realized, and the agent
receives the corresponding payoff.
Assume that for every s, NV(xs, qs) ≥ NV(a), and consider an agent uNV(a)C at
any wealth level and any prior p. In the sequential decision problem, assuming that
a is accepted in the first stage by this agent, then xs is accepted in the second stage
for every s. Also, a is accepted in the first stage even if the option of acquiring xs in
the second stage is absent. Therefore, a is also accepted with the option of acquiring
xs in the second stage. Hence, an optimal strategy for the agent is to accept a,
and then accept xs no matter what s is. In particular, this strategy is better for
the agent than not acquiring any information purchase. This shows that the agent
accepts a+ x, and hence that NV(a+ x) ≥ NV(a).
Now assume that for every s, NV(xs, qs) ≤ NV(a), and consider an agent uρC
with ρ > NV(a) at any wealth level and any prior p. In the sequential decision
problem, assuming that a is accepted in the first stage, it is optimal for this agent
to reject xs after every signal s. Hence, the decision to acquire a in the sequential
decision problem is equivalent to the decision to acquire a alone, and so this agent
rejects a. Hence, the optimal strategy for the agent is to reject information. In
particular, not acquiring any information is better than acquiring a, which is itself
better than acquiring a and xs following every s, so that no information is better
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than a+ x. Therefore, the agent rejects a+ x, which shows that NV(a+ x) < ρ for
every ρ > NV(a). This implies that NV(a+ x) ≤ NV(a).
The third point follows immediately from the first and second points.
Observation 3 relates the normalized value of an information purchase involving
(α, β) to the normalized value of the information purchases involving α and (βs)s.
As a result, the normalized value of an information purchase involving α has to
be measured given the prior p, as in formula (1), but the normalized value of an
information purchase involving βs has to be measured given the belief q
s
α of the
agent after receiving the signal s. The observation makes intuitive sense: if the
agent faces a sequence of purchases whose individual normalized value is increasing,
the normalized value of the overall purchase is at least that of the normalized value
of the first-stage purchase, and so on.
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